Objektibotasun zientifikoaren esanahi orokorraren auzia

Iñaki Requejo Aramendi

doi:10.26876/uztaro.131.2024.5077

Authors

Iñaki Requejo Aramendi UPV/EHU

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26876/uztaro.131.2024.5077

Keywords:

Scientific objectivity, Value-free ideal, Epistemic risk, Appropriate non-epistemic values

Abstract

he aim of this article is to present and discuss the first step to complete the meaning of scientific objectivity. To do this, I will first expose the causes that have generated a multiple understanding of the concept. For example, the decline of the classical definitions, and the impact that have the context and the historical changes when defining objectivity. Second, I will describe the possible ways to define or understand the concept of objectivity. There I will try to explain the increase of the meanings of objectivity and then go on to ask if it possible to combine all the meaning in one general meaning. Third, I will depict the elusive and special nature of the concept. Finally, I will conclude the article presenting a brief proposal of a general meaning.

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