Kant eta Mendelssohn: arrazoimena ezbaian

Abstract

The subject of reason, pursued by questions which it can not solve, is spreaded all over the work of Kant; and this is, precisely, Kant’s most confronted point with the Berliner Illustration, particularly with Mendelssohn. With no relation with experience, reason needs a guide for speculation, for which (historical) Revelation can not serve. While for Kant, the only guide for reason is its own internal necessity (Bedürfniss der Vernunft), for Mendelssohn (after a late recognition of reason’s perplexity), this roll is assumed by the common sense. From both positionings derives an important difference, which, in fact, is an opposition for Kant, between reasonable faith and faith of reason (vernünftiger Glaube vs. Vernunftglaube). This difference is often confused within texts and translations in latin languages. In the necessity for reason, theoretical reason and practical reason go linked.